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Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Defendant/Appellee State of Utah petitions for rehearing, on the
grounds that the Court has overlooked or misapprehended the law and
facts in respect to the points set forth herein.

Counsel for the

State of Utah hereby certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 12(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(Addendum "1")

Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(Addendum "2")

Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration

(Addendum "3")

REVIEW OP FACTS
1.

On June 22, 1988, Appellant filed a Complaint against the

State of Utah and others for damages related to its property in
Moab, Utah.
2.

(R. 1-13).

On August 25, 1988, Appellee State of Utah filed a Motion

for More Definite Statement pursuant to Rule 12 (e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

(R. 41-43).

On September 26, 1988, Judge Bunnell, District Court

Judge, issued a "Ruling on Defendant, State of Utah's, Motion for
More Definite Statement."

(R. 52-53).
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Said Ruling states that

"The Court grants the Motion and orders that the plaintiff file an
amendment to the pleadings . • •

. fl URCP Rule 12 (e) requires that

the amended complaint be filed within ten days or the court may
strike the pleading or "make such order as it deems just."
4.

Said Ruling was mailed to counsel for the various parties

on September 26, 1988,
5.

No

Amended

(R. 53).
Complaint

was

filed.

Apparently,

by

Appellant's own admission, an amended complaint was actually even
prepared by Appellant's counsel, Dale F. Gardiner, on or about
December 1, 1988, but such was never filed, and Appellee State of
Utah was not aware that such was drafted until it was presented as
an exhibit in the subject Motion to Dismiss proceeding in 1993.
(R. 242-253).
6.

In December,

bankruptcy.

1988, Appellant

apparently

filed

for

Appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal of

Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy.

(R. 69) .

The Notice clearly

states that Dale F. Gardiner is withdrawing as counsel and that
"[c]ounsel for Hartford Leasing Corporation is George H. Speciale,
Esq... ." (R. 69).
7.

No Amended Complaint was filed from the date of the
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Court's Ruling (September 26, 1988) to present.
8.

Apparently Appellant entered into a contingency fee

agreement with Steven C. Tycksen in early 1993 (presumably then,
before the Motion to Dismiss was filed).

(See Appellantfs Brief at

24 and R. 284-286).
9.

After four and one-half years, with no amended complaint

filed, Appellee State of Utah, on March 26, 1993, filed a Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice or Strike and Points
and Authorities.

(R. 71-75).

Said Motion indicated that URCP

12(e) required the conforming pleading to be filed within ten (10)
days

or

the

court

may

make

such

order

as

it

deems just.

Additionally, URCP 41(b) was cited as allowing for a dismissal for
lack of compliance with a court order.
10.

On April 7, 1993, Appellant, through attorney Steven C.

Tycksen, filed an objection to the Motion to Dismiss as well as a
seven-page memorandum against such dismissal.

(R. 110-120).

affidavit was also attached to such objection.

(R. 121-125).

11.

On July 15, 1993, Judge Anderson entered an Order of

Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice.
12.

An

(R. 167-169).

Appellant appealed the Judgefs Order of Dismissal.
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ARGUMENT
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD REHEAR THIS MATTER
BECAUSE NO NOTICE UNDER UTAH CODE OP JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION RULE 4-506(3) SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED.
The Utah Court of Appeals in its Opinion filed December
29, 1994, in this matter, relies heavily on the assumption that
the negotiations over occupation of the building with Mr. Speciale
did not indicate that Mr. Speciale was counsel for other than the
bankruptcy.

In fact, your Court at page 8, footnote 6, of the

Opinion, states that:

"Additionally, it would be curious for one

attorney to purport to enter an appearance for another without
making some representation of authority to do so."

(Addendum "4") .

The Court then concluded that Hartford Leasing was unrepresented by
counsel in this matter and that a notice under Utah Code of
Judicial Administration Rule 4-506(3) should have been sent to the
unrepresented Hartford Leasing prior to the Motion to Dismiss
proceeding.
One of the main reasons, your Court should rehear this
matter, is that George Speciale did make such representation of
authority to the State of Utah after the notice was given of his
being the new Hartford Leasing attorney.
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The following letter is

referenced by Hartford Leasing at R. 235:
6/21/89 Speciale letter to Bachman concerning
negotiations to reenter the building (Addendum "5").
The actual letter, a copy of which is attached hereto in Addendum
"6", includes the following statement to the State of Utah from Mr.
Speciale:
My client does not wish to further litigate this
matter since the actions of the State have already
resulted in Hartford's seeking relief under Uie
Bankruptcy Code. (Addendum "6")
"This matter11 is an obvious reference to the subject
case. The State reasonably assumed that Mr. Speciale was the legal
advisor to Hartford Leasing in "this matter" as he purports to
state his clients1 position in regard to the subject litigation.
This statement by Mr. Speciale is followed up by further
rounds of correspondence, including letters to Mr. Speciale from
the State indicating that statements are for purposes of settlement
only.

(See letters dated June 30, 1989, December 5, 1989, and

September 10, 1990, referenced at R. 235 with copies attached
hereto in Addendum "7").

That statement in the letters only makes

sense if Mr. Speciale is the counsel to Hartford Leasing in this
litigation.

Mr Speciale did not write back that he was only the
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counsel for the bankruptcy.
For instance, note that the September 10, 1990 letter to
Mr. Speciale from Mr. Bachman of the Utah Attorney Generalfs Office
refers to the "subject property of the Hartford Leasing Corporation
lawsuit." (Addendum "7").

That letter also states "for purposes of

settlement of this matter only"... and that a "stipulated dismissal
with prejudice from the subject lawsuit would also be required."
This letter is speaking to Mr. Speciale as more than just the
bankruptcy attorney, but also as the attorney for the subject
lawsuit.
indicating

There is no response from Mr. Speciale to this letter
that

he

has

no

authority

to

enter

into

such a

stipulation for dismissal with prejudice.
The State of Utah reasonably believing through the
actions or inactions of Appellant's counsel, that Appellant was
represented in the subject litigation, did not send a notice under
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-506(3) before filing
its Motion to Dismiss. The Motions to Dismiss by the State and one
other Defendant, were served on Mr. Speciale. (R. 73 and 78).
In any event, the language of Utah Code of Judicial
Administration Rule 4-506(3) only requires that notice be provided
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to an "unrepresented" person.

Appellant admits that it had a

contingency fee agreement with the new counsel in this matter,
Steven Tycksen, presumably prior to the filing of Appellee's Motion
to Dismiss on March 26, 1993 (R.285-287). This matter is raised in
Appelleefs Brief at p. 3.

Therefore, Appellant was not

"unrepresented" at the time of the Motion to Dismiss, and there is
not duty to serve a notice on a "represented" person.
PREJUDICE AND INJUSTICE
The State would be greatly prejudiced if the case were to
move forward.

How can the State have conducted proper discovery

over the past years when the State does not yet know what the
Complaint is, since it was required to be amended?

Additionally,

Mr. Specialefs letter indicates that Hartford Leasing is not
interested in pursuing the litigation.

It is unreasonable to

expect the public to fund major discovery when the Complaint has
not been amended (and therefore no complaint really exists) and the
counsel is indicating that the client does not desire to pursue the
litigation.
When a District Court grants a Motion for More Definite
Statement and the plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, and
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over four and one-years passes since the ten (10) day deadline,
justice is served by dismissing the matter.
CONCLUSION
The State of Utah had no legal obligation to send a
notice under Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-506(3) for
any or all of the following reasons:
1.

The notice of withdrawal of counsel indicates that

Mr. Speciale is that new counsel for Hartford Leasing and the
latter correspondence between the State and Mr. Speciale gave the
State every reasonable indication that Mr. Speciale was advising
Hartford Leasing on the litigation.

Mr. Speciale represented to

the State the position of his client in terms of this litigation.
2.

The correspondence to Mr. Speciale from the State

indicates that it is for purposes of settlement only.
4.

Mr. Speciale was served by the State and another

Defendant with the Motions to Dismiss.
5.

(See R. 73 and 78).

In any event, by Appellantfs own admission they were

represented by counsel at the time the Motion to Dismiss was filed.
The notice provision of Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule
4-506(3) only applies to an "unrepresented client."
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(See R. 285-

287) .
Based on the foregoing, Appellee State of Utah
respectfully requests that this Court grant the Petition for
Rehearing, and affirm the order of the Seventh Judicial District
Court which granted the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

ALAN S. SACHMAN
Assistant Attorney General

Hailing Certificate

I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of January, 1995,
I caused two copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to be
mailed by United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the
following:
STEVEN C. TYCKSEN
Attorney at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM 1
Rule 12(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

forming papers. The clerk or the court may waive the
requirements of this rule for parties appearing pro se.
For good cause shown, the court may relieve any
party of any requirement of this rule.
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an
original pleading or paper filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed
and used in lieu of the original.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.)
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and
other papers; sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in his individual name who is
duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The
attorney's address also shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certification by him that he has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his
answer within twenty days after the service of the
summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise
expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A
party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim
against him shall serve an answer thereto within
twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff
shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer
within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a
reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise
directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters
these periods of time as follows, unless a different
time is fixed by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones
its disposition until the trial on the merits, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be

Rule 12

served within ten days after the service of the
more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact,
to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one
is required, except that the following defenses may at
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall
be made before pleading if a further pleading i6 permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections
in a responsive pleading or motion or by further
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection.
If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in
law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After
the pleadings are closed but within such time as not
to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment
on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this
rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and
the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c)
of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial
on application of any party, unless the court orders
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a
pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted
is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he
may move for a more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the
court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the
order or within such other time as the court may fix,
the court may strike the pleading to which the motion
was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party
before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service
of the pleading upon him, the court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who
makes a motion under this rule may join with it the
other motions herein provided for and then available

ADDENDUM 2
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand
a jury in an action in which such a demand might
have been made of right, the court in its discretion
upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all
issues.
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent In all
actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon
motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with
an advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties,
may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the
same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of
right.
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance.
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts
shall provide by rule for the placing of actions upon
the trial calendar (1) without request ofthe parties or
(2) upon request of a party and notice to the other
parties or (3) in such other manner as the courts may
deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to actions
entitled thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a
party, the court may in its discretion, and upon such
terms as may be just, including the payment of costs
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or
proceeding upon good cause shown. If the motion is
made upon the ground of the absence of evidence,
such motion shall also set forth the materiality ofthe
evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that
due diligence has been used to procure it. The court
may also require the party seeking the continuance
to state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he
expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon
admits that such evidence would be given, and that it
may be considered as actually given on the trial, or
offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not
be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present If required by the adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have the testimony of any witness present taken, in the same
manner as if at the trial; and the testimony so taken
may be read on the trial with the same effect, and
subject to the same objections that may be made with
respect to a deposition under the provisions of Rule
32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B)].
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to
the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of
any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation,
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of the United States
or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court Except as provided in
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems
-proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a

Rule 42

defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not
be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by
the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts
may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the
court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in thi6 rule,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim. The provisions of this rule apply
to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the
claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any
court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the court
may make such order for the payment of costs of the
action previously dismissed as it may deem proper
and may stay the proceedings in the action until the
plaintiff has complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a party dismiss his complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond
or undertaking filed in support of such provisional
remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to
the adverse party against whom such provisional
remedy was obtained.
Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials.
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, thirdparty claims, or issues.

ADDENDUM 3
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Rule 4-408

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

restrictions, limitations or requirements as the
regulating authority deems appropriate; to suspend the surety's qualification pending compliance with specified provisions of this rule; or to
disqualify the surety. The decision shall be based
on the facts appearing in the file maintained by
the regulating authority and the facts presented
in evidence at the hearing. The decision shall
include the reasons therefor, notice of any right
of review, and the time limit for filing for such a
review. The decision shall be served upon the
surety by mailing the same, via first class mail,
to the surety's last known address on file with
the regulating authority.
(H) Any party aggrieved by the decision of the
regulating authority may file a petition for judicial review within thirty days after the date of
the decision. Judicial review shall be governed by
the procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-15.
(Amended effective January 15,1990; April 15,1991;
January 1, 1992; February 1, 1993.)
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent*
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated as locations of trial courts
of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City;
Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork;
West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial
court of record of any subject matter jurisdiction may
hold court in any location designated by this rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)
ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions,
supporting memoranda and documents with the
court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts except proceedings before the
court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to
petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters,
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and
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copies of or citations by page number to relevant
portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court
on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appliestion is made to file an over-length memorandum,
the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in
excess of ten pages, the application shall include
a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed
five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion.
The responding party shall file and serve upon
all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion,
and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify
the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this
rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party
may serve and file a reply memorandum within
five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk
to submit the matter to the court for decision.
The notification shall be in the form of a separate
written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion.
The points and authorities in support of a motion
for summary judgment shall begin with a section
that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which movant contends no genuine
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer
to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authonties in opposition to
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with
a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed.
All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3Kb) or (4) below.
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OPERATION OF THE COURTS

(b) In cases where the granting of a motion
would dispose of the action or any issues in the
action on the merits with prejudice, either party
at the time of filing the principal memorandum
in support of or in opposition to a motion may file
a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the
court shall notify the requesting party. When a
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting
party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and
time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of
points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered
to the judge hearing the matter at least two
working days before the date set for hearing.
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies
and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk
of the court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made
at the time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court may grant a
request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or
where the motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own
motion or at a party's request may direct arguments
of any motion by telephone conference without court
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all
telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases.
Intent:

Rule 4-503

on the other parties and the date of service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the
clerk of the court.
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall
retain the original with a copy of the proof of service
affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request
and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party responding to the discovery request
shall retain t i e original with a copy of the proof of
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or
counsel. The discovery requests and response shall
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the
court on motion and notice and for good cause shown
so orders.
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance
with a discovery request or a motion which relies
upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the
discovery request or response which is at issue in the
motion.
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court except as provided in this Code or upon order of
the court for good cause shown.
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery proceedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all
responses thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with the court no later than thirty (30)
days before the date set for trial of the case. The right
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30)
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the
court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30)
days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case upon notice to the other parties in
the action. In exercising its discretion, the court shall
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for
such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of
the parties seeking such discovery, Whether permitting such discovery will prevent the case from going
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to
any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of
the trial date.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting
and requesting jury instructions.
Applicability:

To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery
documents.
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures
within 30 days of trial.

This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and
Justice Courts.

Applicability:

(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented
to the court five days prior to the scheduled trial date
unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court, in
its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury instructions at any time prior to the submission of the
case to the jury. At the time of presentation to the
court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be
furnished to opposing counsel.
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing
and state in full the instruction requested. Each request shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the

This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and
Circuit Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33,
34 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall
notfilediscovery requests with the clerk of the court,
but shall file only the original certificate of service
stating that the discovery requests have been served

Statement of the Rule:
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ORHE, Associate Presiding Judge:
Plaintiff Hartford Leasing Corporation appeals the trial
court's decision to grant, with prejudice, defendant State of
Utah's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. We reverse
and remand.
FACTS
Events leading up to the legal dispute at issue here are of
little relevance to our decision, and thus ve focus on the
procedural facts. The State of Utah leased office space in a
building located in Moab, Utah, owned by Hartford Leasing. On
June 22, 1988, Hartford filed a complaint against the State,
alleging breach of the lease agreement after the State quit the
premises and ceased paying rent.1 The State filed a Motion for

1. Three original defendants in this complaint, Rio Vista Oil
Limited, LaSal Oil Company, and Dependable Janitorial Service,
are not parties to this appeal, having been previously dismissed
tram

Vhm aefcion.

More Definite Statement on August 25, 1988, pursuant to Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(e)• The trial court granted the motion on
September 28, 1988, and called for an amended complaint.
Hartford did not file an amended complaint, although one was
prepared by its attorney, Dale Gardiner.
Hartford filed for bankruptcy on December 1, 1988. On
December 30, 1988, Gardiner filed a Notice of Withdrawal of
Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy, which was duly served on the
State. Both notices were combined in a single document, which
read as follows:
Dale F« Gardiner, attorney at law,
withdraws as counsel for the plaintiff in the
above entitled action*
NOTICE is also given that on December 1,
1988, Hartford Leasing Corporation filed a
chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Utah. Counsel for Hartford Leasing
Corporation is George H. Speciale, Esq., 5
Triad Center #585, Salt Lake City, Utah
84180.
Hartford's bankruptcy case was concluded on October 29, 1990.
After Gardiner's notice, no further documents were'tailed in
the instant action until March 26, 1993, when the State filed a
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution. In support of its
motion, the State contended that Hartford failed to take any
action in the case over a four~and-one-half year period and had
not filed an amended complaint, in response to the Motion for
More Definite Statement, within the ten-day period required by
Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure• However, the
State had not, at any time after receiving word of Gardiner's
withdrawal, notified Hartford, in accordance with Rule 4*506(3)
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, that it must retain
new counsel* By the terms of Rule 4*506(3), such notice must be
given "before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings.w
On April 12, 1993, in response to the State's motion to
dismiss, Hartford#s new attorney, Steven Tycksen, filed a Notice
of Appearance of Counsel, a Request for Scheduling, and
Objections to Defendant's Motion for Dismissal, which also
included a request for oral argument. On June 8, 1993, Hartford
filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and a Notice to Submit for Decision, which
stated that "Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Motion for
Dismissal • . • is now at issue and ready for decision of the
Court."

The trial court made three rulings related to the State's
Motion to Dismiss. First, in its ruling issued June 21, 1993,
the court granted the State's motion, finding that Hartford
failed to move the case forward during the four-and-one-half year
period since its initial filing. The court noted the State's
failure to notify Hartford concerning the appointment of new
counsel, but stated that this failure was remedied by giving
Hartford adequate time to obtain new counsel and respond to the
motion. Additionally, the court refused to accept Hartford's
supplemental memorandum and thus did not consider the information
contained therein.
Second, after receiving no objections to this decision, the
trial court issued an Order of Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution
with Prejudice on July 15. However, Hartford had submitted an
objection to the June 21 ruling via facsimile, which was
transmitted between 4:58 p.m. and 5:10 p.m. on July 15, but the
order had already been filed when the transmission was received.
In its objection, Hartford contended that the court should not
have made its decision without hearing oral arguments, that
dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate, that the court erred
in considering the motion absent the State's compliance with Rule
4-506, and that the court erred in refusing to consider its
supplemental memorandum.
Finally, on July 19, the court ruled on Hartford's
objections by affirming its order to dismiss. It state,d that
Hartford's Notice to Submit for Decision waived its original
request for oral argument and that supplemental memoranda are not
permitted by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration so that the court could not consider the
additional information contained therein.
Hartford appeals.
ISSUES
Although Hartford raises a number of issues, the thrust of
Hartford's appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion
by dismissing, for failure to prosecute, Hartford's complaint.
We therefore consider only the following two issues: (1) whether
the court abused its discretion in granting the State's Notion to
Dismiss when the State had failed to first comply with the
requirements of Rule 4-506(3) of the Code of Judicial
Administration and (2) whether the court erred in its
interpretation of Rule 4-501 when it refused to accept Hartford's
supplemental memorandum.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a trial court's decision to dismiss for failure
to prosecute, we accord the trial court broad discretion and do
not disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion and a
likelihood that an injustice has occurred• Charlie Brown Constr.
Co, v. Leisure Sports, Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App.),
cert, deniedr 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). In determining whether
the court abused its discretion, we "balance the need to expedite
litigation and efficiently utilize judicial resources with the
need to allow parties to have their day in court.11 Meadow Fresh
Farms. Inc. v. Utah state Univ.. 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah App.
1991). Of course, the goal of affording parties "an opportunity
to be heard11 is the essential purpose of the court system, and
thus our system values this goal over that of judicial economy.
Westinahouse Elec Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc..
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).
A trial court's interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App.
1994).
DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
In our consideration of a trial court's dismissal for
failure to prosecute, we look to factors besides the mere elapse
of time since the case was filed. Both the Utah Supreme Court
and this court have considered, where appropriate, at least five
additional factors: (1) Mthe conduct of both parties"; (2) the
opportunity available to each party to move the case forward; (3)
what each party has accomplished in moving the case forward;2 (4)
the difficulty or prejudice imposed on the opposing party by
reason of the delay; and (5) "most important, whether injustice
may result from the dismissal." Westinahouse Elec. Supply CO. V.
Paul W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).
Accord Country Meadows Convalescent Ctr. v. Department of Health.
851 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Utah App. 1993). See K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean.

2. We pause to note the obvious: What each party has done to
move the case forward can only be evaluated in light of each
party's responsibility concerning the case. Of course, the
plaintiff, as the party initiating the lawsuit, has the primary
responsibility to move the case forward. The defendant's
responsibility is limited to responding timely to the action,
expeditiously attending to discovery, and moving any counterclaim
along. The defendant has no general responsibility to move
plaintiff's action to judgment.
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656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982); Utah Oil Co, v. Harris. 565 P.2d
1135, 1137 (Utah 1977); Meadow Fresh Farms. Inc. v. Utah State
Univ.. 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991). Application of
these factors, to which we now turn, requires consideration of
the ••*totality of the circumstances'11 in order to determine
,f
*[w]hether delay is a ground for the dismissal of an action. ',|3
Country Meadows. 851 P.2d at 1215 (quoting Department of Social
Servs. v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980)).
A.

Conduct, Opportunity and Accomplishments of Parties
1. Effect of Bankruptcy Petition

Each party seeks refuge behind the pendency of the related
bankruptcy proceeding: Hartford points to it as explanation for
why it did nothing in the instant case for at least two years out
of the more than four-year period of inactivity; the State
suggests the bankruptcy filing precluded it from giving Hartford
notice to appoint counsel.
The Bankruptcy Code does not offer complete shelter to
either party as a means to escape their respective
responsibilities in moving this case forward. See Maxfield v.
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 241-42 (Utah App.) (Orme, J., concurring),
cert, denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). Even assuming the State
was prevented from filing the notice to appoint counsel by the
automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988), a
proposition which is questionable in any event,4 this would not

3. We note that in the course of our review, we do not consider
the evidence contained in the supplemental memorandum. We are
limited to the evidence properly before the trial court. Adamson
v. Brockbank. 112 Utah 52, 78, 185 P.2d 264, 277 (1947);
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass#n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah
App. 1989). In the instant case, the information contained in
the supplemental memorandum was not before the trial court. In
two separate rulings, issued on June 21 and July 19, the trial
court stated that the supplemental memorandum was not permitted,
and that it refused to consider the information contained
therein. As hereinafter explained, the trial court's ruling in
this respect was correct.
4. So far as judicial proceedings are concerned, section 362
refers only to proceedings "against the debtor.M 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(1) (1988). £ee, ?,qt, Ejelge-m v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276,
1277 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994); Victor Foods. Inc. v. Crossroads
Economic Dev.. Inc.. 977 F.2d 1224, 1226-27 (8th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam) (debtor's bankruptcy did not toll statute of limitations
(continued...)

explain why the notice was not given during the two-and-one-half
year period following termination of the bankruptcy case.
While Hartford's bankruptcy posture imposed financial
hardship and procedural complexities that offer some rationale
for its failure to move the case forward, its hands were not
completely tied. As a bankruptcy debtor, it could have pursued
this case either as a Chapter 11 debtor in possession or through
a trustee,5 particularly where, as here, an outcome in its favor
would have added assets to the banJcruptcy estate. The bankruptcy
trustee may hire, with court approval and ••for a specified
special purpose,11 an attorney to represent the bankrupt debtor in
matters "in the best interest of the estate91 but unrelated to the
trustee's duties in estate administration. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e)
(1988). See Conticommoditv Servs.. Inc. v. Raaan, 826 F.2d 600,
602 (7th Cir. 1987) (in litigation commenced pre-bankruptcy,
trustee became real party in interest and retention of counsel by
trustee was within exclusive jurisdiction of bankruptcy court).
Therefore, pendency of the bankruptcy case does not
completely excuse Hartford from taking action, nor does it excuse
the State's failure to give the required notice to appoint
counsel, at least for the period following the conclusion of the
bankruptcy case.

4. (...continued)
because automatic stay applies to actions filed against debtor,
not by debtor); Martin-Triaona v. Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989) (defendant able to
initiate a motion to dismiss complaint brought by bankrupt
plaintiff, notwithstanding automatic stay, because stay does not
apply to actions brought by debtor); Carlev Capital Group v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.. 889 F.2d 1126, 1127 (D.C Cir. 1989)
(per curiam) (automatic stay inapplicable to actions brought by
debtor that would benefit bankruptcy estate); Rhett White Motor
Sales Co. v. Wells Farao Bank. 99 B.R. 12, 15 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1989) ("[SJtay provisions are not designed to stay actions which
have been commenced by the bankrupt party.11).
5. Under Chapter 11, a trustee is appointed "for cause" or "in
the interests of creditors," 11 U.S.C. S 1104(a) (1988);
otherwise, the debtor continues in possession. If there was no
reason to appoint a trustee in Hartford's case, Hartford was a
debtor in possession and was entitled, with limited exceptions
not pertinent here, to all the powers with which trustees are
invested. £££ 11 U.S.C. S 1107(a) (1988).
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2.

Rule 4-506

The State's failure to comply with the notice requirements
regarding legal counsel, unambiguously imposed by the Utah Code
of Judicial Administration, is at the heart of our analysis of
the State's responsibility, conduct, and opportunity to move this
case forward. We recognize that Hartford, as plaintiff, bears
the initial burden of prosecuting its claim diligently. Meadow
Fresh Farms. Inc. v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah
App. 1991). The State's responsibility, as a defendant which has
not asserted a claim for affirmative relief, is limited. See
suora note 2. However, the requirement of Rule 4-506 presents
precisely the type of requirement with which the State must
comply in discharge of its responsibility as a defendant. The
pertinent provisions of the rule state:
When an attorney . . . withdraws from the
case or ceases to act as an attorney,
opposing counsel must notify, in writing, the
unrepresented client of his/her
responsibility to retain another attorney or
appear in person before opposing counsel can
initiate further proceedings against the
client. A copy of the written notice shall
be filed with the court and no further
proceedings shall be held in the matter until
20 davs have elapsed from the date of filing..
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-506(3) (emphasis added). Given a plain
reading of Rule 4-506, the State was precluded from filing its
motion to dismiss without first giving the required notice.
Nonetheless, it failed to give that notice before filing its
motion to dismiss.
We are unpersuaded by the State's contention that it took
Gardiner's notice to mean that Speciale had entered his
appearance as counsel for Hartford in place of Gardiner, and thus
no notice to appoint counsel was necessary. Examination of
Gardiner's withdrawal of counsel and bankruptcy notice shows that
its terms, when taken in context, are not ambiguous and indicate
Speciale was Hartford's bankruptcy attorney and not Hartford's
attorney in the instant action. Hention of Speciale's
representation is in the same paragraph as the notice of
bankruptcy and not part of the withdrawal of counsel paragraph
that preceded it. The trial court correctly observed that the
lack of an express notice of appearance should have indicated to

the State that Hartford was without counsel in the instant action
upon Gardiner's withdrawal/
The trial court found that "[g]iven the ambiguity [sic] in
the notice of withdrawal and the absence of a notice of
appearance by other counsel, the [State] should have given a
notice under Rule 4-506." However, the trial court erred when it
went on to excuse the State's failure to send Hartford the
required notice. The court determined that ••the remedy for such
a failure is not necessarily denial of the motion. The remedy is
to grant Hartford sufficient time after a pleading is filed in
violation of Rule 4-506 to obtain counsel and adequately respond.
It is evident that Hartford has had that opportunity." The
rule's provisions, however, offer no room for such discretion to
excuse compliance: "opposing counsel must notify . . . before
opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings.11 Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R4-506(3) (emphasis added).
In addition, the trial court failed to consider the
particular importance of giving the required notice to Hartford,
a corporation, prior to the State's filing of its motion. Unlike
the individual litigant who may, by the terms of Rule 4-506,
either appoint new counsel or proceed pro se, Hartford's status
as a corporation precludes self-representation because
corporations are artificial entities that are not allowed to
represent themselves in court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40
(1992) ; Tracv-Burke Assocs. v. Department of Employment Sec.. 699
P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Tuttle v. Hi-Land
Dairyman's Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1960).
Until the required notice was given, Hartford could afford to be
somewhat complacent, knowing that the State could do nothing
until it had first given Hartford the required notice to appoint

6. The State's contention that Speciale appeared to have
replaced Gardiner as counsel for Hartford is untenable for other
reasons. Negotiations over occupation of the building between
Speciale and the State's counsel are not, as suggested by the
State, evidence that Speciale was counsel for Hartford in this
action. The building was the primary asset of the bankruptcy
estate, and there was no reason to assume Speciale was conducting
anything but bankruptcy business on behalf of the estate.
Additionally, it would be curious for one attorney to purport to
enter an appearance for another without making some
representation of authority to do so.
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new counsel. Until such notice was given, it was as though the
State acquiesced in Hartford's failure to move the action along.7
B.

Prejudice

In its ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial court
indicated that it ^discounts some of those claims [of prejudice]
because most of the defendants have had the opportunity and the
incentive to gather much of the same evidence in related
matters." We agree with the court's analysis of this factor, and
thus will not belabor it.
C.

Injustice

We now consider whether Hartford would suffer injustice by
not having its day in court, giving due regard to the State's
failure to give the notice required by Rule 4-506. "Dismissal
with prejudice . . . is a harsh and permanent remedy when it
precludes a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their

7. We also wish to note that the effect of the State's failure
to give the required notice to appoint counsel does not, as
Hartford suggests, deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.
Courts lack actual jurisdiction by reason of defects in notice
only in limited circumstances. See, e.g.. Garcia v. Garcia. 712
P.2d 288, 290 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (court lacks personal
jurisdiction if service of process requirements under Rule 4 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure not met); Lamarr v. State Deo't
of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 542 (Utah App. 1992) (compliance with
notice provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993) required to
confer subject matter jurisdiction over claim against state
agency). In contrast, failure to adhere to more routine notice
requirements does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. See,
e.g.. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 854 n.3 (Utah 1979)
(defective notice to quit in an unlawful detainer action results
in failure to state a claim, but not lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); In re Clinton. 762 P.2d 1381, 1386-87 (Colo. 1988)
(failure to comply with statutory requirement for appointment of
counsel in mental health proceedings does not affect personal
jurisdiction). Once a court properly acquires jurisdiction, it
is not lost through subsequent procedural events. Secrest v.
Simonet. 708 P.2d 803, 807 (Colo. 1985); State ex rel. Owens v.
Hodaer 641 P.2d 399, 405-06 (Kan. 1982). In the instant case,
the action had been filed, the defendants served, and the trial
court already had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
The State's failure to send notice to appoint counsel under Rule
4-506 does not destroy the court's jurisdiction—it merely
precludes the State from doing anything in the case until the
requirement has been met.

merits.w Bonneville Tower Condominium Mat, Corom. v. Thompson
Michie Assocs.. Inc.. 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). See
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters.
Inc.. 16 Utah 2d 211, 216, 398 P.2d 685, 688 (1965) (pretrial
dismissal is Ma drastic action . . . used sparingly and with
great caution11). While Hartford has hardly been blameless over
the period of more than four years since it filed its complaint,
the state's failure to give notice to appoint counsel before
filing its motion weighs heavily—indeed, conclusively—in
Hartford's favor. Proper notice to appoint new counsel under
Rule 4-506 is critically important, and would have let Hartford
know that the State was tired of waiting and intended to take
further action on the claim against it. Such notice would likely
have spurred Hartford to action, as demonstrated by the plethora
of legal documents filed by Tycksen concurrent with his Notice of
Appearance and in, response to the State's Motion to Dismiss.8 It
would indeed be unjust to deprive Hartford of its day in court
given the State's failure to provide the required notice.
D.

Summary

The State's failure to give notice to appoint counsel prior
to filing its motion to dismiss, coupled with the other factors
discussed above, rendered it improper for the trial court to
dismiss Hartford's action, notwithstanding the inordinate period
of inactivity that preceded the State's motion.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY MEMORANDUM
Hartford contends that the plain language of Rule 4-501 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration allows supplemental
memoranda to be submitted to the trial court, and the court erred
in not accepting its second memorandum. Although we need not
reach this issue given our above disposition, the question is
apparently one of some controversy among the bar, has been ably
briefed by counsel, and is not the kind of issue that often

8. Hartford responded to the Motion to Dismiss two weeks after
it was filed. Had the State first filed a notice to appoint
counsel, Hartford would obviously have had an opportunity to
reactivate its claim before the elapse of the 20-day period
prescribed by Rule 4-506(3), rendering any intended motion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute of academic interest only. ££.
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc. 571 P.2d 1368, 1369-70 (Utah 1977)
(finding court had abused its discretion in dismissing case for
failure to prosecute when party's motion to dismiss filed
concurrently with its answer)•
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arises on appeal.
worth.

Thus, we offer our opinion for what it may be

We disagree with Hartford and see no error in the court's
handling of this question. Rule 4-501 states, in part, as
follows:
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda.
All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte
matters, shall be accompanied by a, memorandum
of points and authorities . . . .
Memoranda
supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of
the court on ex-parte application. . . .
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion.
The responding party shall file and serve
upon all parties within ten days after
service of a motion, a. memorandum in
opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party
may serve and file a reply memorandum within
five days after service of the responding
party's memorandum.
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-501(l)(a)-(c) (emphasis added)'.
In interpreting a statute or rule, we examine its " % plain
language and resort to other methods . . . only if the language
is ambiguous.'" Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 287
(Utah App.) (quoting State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 493
(Utah App. 1993)), cert, denied. 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994). Here,
it is clear that the plural "memoranda" which appears in the rule
and on which Hartford relies, refers to all memoranda received by
the court—from all parties that either oppose or support any
motion-*and does not mean that each party may submit more than
one memorandum. We agree with the State's contention that the
ten-page limit imposed by Rule 4-501(1)(a) would be completely
ineffective if a party could freely file supplemental memoranda.
Subsection (a) and subsection (b) explicitly provide for only a
single memorandum to be filed in support of or opposition to a
particular motion. Indeed, the only additional memorandum
allowed is the reply memorandum provided for by subsection (c),
but that option is limited to the moving party. In the case at
hand, Hartford is the non-moving party.
Furthermore, "[a] trial judge is accorded broad discretion
in determining how a [case] shall proceed in his or her

courtroom." University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d
630, 633 (Utah 1987)• Accordingly, the trial court in this case
was well within its discretion in refusing to accept a
supplemental memorandum that was submitted without prior
invitation and outside the bounds of duly promulgated procedural
rules.9
CONCLUSION
Given the totality of circumstances, the trial court abused
its discretion in granting the state's Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Prosecution. However, the trial court did not err in refusing
to accept Hartford's supplemental memorandum in opposition to
this motion. We reverse and remand to the trial court for such
further proceedings as may now be appropriate.

GregorirK. Orme,
Associate Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:
?*

%yZimmm*t*m £ ^

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

9. Nothing prevents the trial court from receiving additional
memoranda if it wishes to do so. We merely hold that Hartford
was not entitled to submit the additional memorandum as a matter
of right. Hartford may have been more successful in gaining
acceptance of its supplemental memorandum if it had first sought
leave of court. Counsel could have filed a motion, stating the
reasons the information was not included in the original
memorandum, and requested permission to submit an additional
memorandum. ££• Utah R. Civ. P. 15(d) (motion to allow
supplemental pleadings, at discretion of court); Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1), (2) (motion for relief from judgment for excusable
neglect or newly discovered evidence); Utah Code Jud. Admin.
R4-501(l)(a) (over-length memorandum may be submitted with prior
leave of court on ex parte application)•
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DAVIS, Judge (concurring in the result):
I concur in the result reached by the court because the
mandatory language of Rule 4-506 makes notification of the
unrepresented party an express precondition to initiation of
further proceedings against that party. The rule mandates notice
prior to initiation of further proceedings, and the proceedings
may be held twenty days after the date of filing the notice. The
rule does not require a twenty-day waiting period between the
filing of the notice and initiation of further proceedings.
Thus, under the terms of the rule, the State could have filed the
notice required under Rule 4-506 immediately prior to its March
26, 1993 motion to dismiss; and, under the rule, the court would
not be in a position to hold proceedings on the motion until
twenty days after the filing of the notice—on or about April 15,
1993. On April 12, 1993, and June 8, 1993, plaintiff filed
responsive pleadings, and the court made rulings on June 21, July
15, and July 19, 1993, all approximately ninety days after the
State filed its motion to dismiss without having first given
notice as required by Rule 4-506.
But for the mandatory language contained in Rule 4-506, I
believe the trial court's analysis of this issue would have been
entirely correct, as any purpose to be served by the provisions
of Rule 4-506 was served by the lapse of time between the
initiation of proceedings by the State and the conduct of those
proceedings by the court. For the foregoing reasons, I also
disagree with the court's analysis that plaintiff suffered some
sort of injustice as a result of the State's failure to perform
an act that, under the facts of this case, was hardly more than
ministerial. The record does not suggest that plaintiff relied
upon or in any way changed its position in reliance on the
State's failure to file notice under the rule or that had
plaintiff reactivated the case in response to a Rule 4-506
notice, any of the dismissal factors set out on pages 4-5 of the
court's opinion would have been resolved in plaintiff's favor.
While the State may have been remiss in failing to comply with
the provisions of Rule 4-506, it can hardly be suggested that the
motion to dismiss did not let plaintiff know that the State was
tirecK^f waiting and plaintiff was, in fact, spurred to action.

ADDENDUM 5
Hartford Leasing Information (R.235)

HARTFORD LEASING INFORMATION OBTAINED BY
DISCOVERY AND OTHER EFFORTS
ZN FURTHERANCE OF PROSECUTING THE CASE
DATE

Nature of Item

4/20/84

State's offer for bids

5/1/84

Hartford Leasing's proposal in response to bid

8/27/84

Department of Administrative Services, Division of
Facilities Construction & Management, Management
Information Systems leased facility Report

9/24/84

Facilities Construction & management
systems Data Entry Worksheet

11/1/84

State signs lease with Hartford

5/22/85

Hartford entered Lease with State

5/22/85

State amends lease with hartford

4/14/86

William Lund, Site Investigation Section, State of
Utah Natural Resources, letter to James Adamson,
Southeastern Utah Health District copying report on
Moab gas leak prepared by William Case, geologist

6/?/86

EPA report on effects of gasoline in drinking water

11/19/86

Utah Geological and Mineral Survey letter to Ray
Klepzig, La Sal, concerning above agency's report
on water level data

11/19/86

EarthFax Engineering, Inc. letter to raymond
Klepzig, La Sal Oil report concerning gas leak

12/1/86

McVey, Utah Industrial Commission, letter to
Adamson, S.E. Ut. Health District, concerning
results of bore samples performed 11/7/86

12/7/86

Environmental Response Team for the Department of
Health
issues
"Soil Gas Survey of Leaking
Underground Storage Tanks in Moab, Utah"

1/7/87

Guidance for Indoor Air Quality Investigations
prepared by
the Rocky Mountain Center for
Occupational and Environmental Health

1/7/87

Enviresponse, Inc. issues "Oil Fingerprint and
Gasoline Quantification for Water Samples, Moab Utah"

2/3/87

Memo from
Monitoring

information

C. jay Silvernale, RCRA Compliance
Hydrologist to Mike Holmes, EPA,

*

/

s

Judicial Administration
1/30/89

Gardiner letter to Speciale turning over materials
and requesting payment for materials received from
the EPA

5/1/89

Hartford Leasing receives Proposal and Contract
from E & G Contractors of Pocatello, Idaho to make
corrections to the building

5/9/89

unsigned document from whomever was representing
Hartford
concerning
arrears
and
potential
settlement of this matter

6/21/89

Speciale letter to Bachman concerning negotiations
to reenter the building

6/30/89

Bachman letter to Speciale concerning negotiations
for State to reenter builfrtrrg _

7/12/89

Speciale
letter
negotiations with
building

7/26/89

Suitter, Axland submitted Preliminary Assessment
report prepared by State of Utah, Department of
Health, Division of Environmental Health, to George
Speciale

8/1/89

Hartford Leasing meeting with State and Insurance
companies

9/9/89

Deposition of jack Quintana taken

12/5/89

Bachman letter to Speciale concerning negotiations
between State and Hartford Leasing about State
reentering the building

12/6/89

Speciale
Letter
to
Applegate
concerning
negotiations with State to reenter building

12/21/89

Traveler's Letter to Speciale concerning dismissing
Dependable Janitorial Service from the lawsuit.

12/26/89

Speciale
letter
negotiations with
building

1/22/90

Bachman letter to Speciale negotiating the
conditions which must be met for the State to
reenter the building

3/2/90

Bachman letter to Speciale concerning purchase of
building

to
Applegate-- concerning
State over reoccupying the

to
Applegate
concerning
State over reoccupying the

ADDENDUM 6
Copy of 6/21/89 Letter from Speciale to Bachman
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June 21, 1989
Alan Bachman
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

RE: Moab Regional Center/Hartford Leasing Corporation
Dear Alan,
Following the meeting between yourself representing the State;
Jack D. Quintana and Joyce Milne of the Division of Facilities
Construction and Management; LeRoy S. Axland (briefly) attorney for
LaSalle Oil Company, Inc.; H. James Clegg attorney for Rio Vista Oil
Ltd.; and myself as attorney for Hartford, you suggested that my
client present a proposal for resolution of the continuing default of
the State under its Lease Agreement for the building commomy
referred to as the Moab Regional Center.
Also present were advocates of "the Toxigon™ System",
described as "in situ biochemical/biological treatment systems for
elimination of organic contaminates from soil or water" consisting of
two consultants and a contractor.
In preparing to write this letter, I have reviewed a number of
documents, including the deposition of Jack Quintana, the Delta
Environmental Consultant's Report, the Lease Agreement, and the
study conducted by the Rocky Mountain Center for Occupational and
Environmental Health of the University of Utah, for for the Division
of Facilities Construction and Management.
As you know, I organized the meeting for expressly the
purpose of seeking resolution of the continuing refusal of the State to
honor its obligations under the Lease, and I was disappointed that
the State had nothing to offer by way of resolution except the excuse

that its refusal to occupy the building is the result principally of a
sinjle State employee who is, if I recall the language exactly, "kinda
hysterical."
The consultants, who had everything to gain by undertaking
treatment or elimination of the supposed gasoline flume under the
building, concluded that the studies of the building which they
reviewed indicated virtually undetectable levels of hydrocarbons.
The study performed by the Rocky Mountain Center for
Occupational and Environmental Health represents a study in
indecision as to why employees might have health complaints.
Perhaps the most telling recommendation is the suggestion that the
owner erect "a status board mounted in the hallway with lights to
demonstrate fan operation and fresh air damper position."
Other recommendations relate to modifications to the building
itself which, it should be noted, was built strictly to specifications
provided by the DFCM.
In short, the State's complaint is «ut that the premises have
been damaged in such a way as to make the building untenable, but
that a panic has grown up among its employees which it lacks the
ability to remedy. I find it incredible that the State is itself
eminently satisfied with the building and desires a solution which
would enable it to reoccupy the premises, but has not resolved what
appears to be its own personnel problems.
My client does not wish to further litigate this matter since the
actions of the State have already resulted in Hartford's seeking relief
under the Bankruptcy Code.
Hartford is eager to render whatever assistance it can in order
to satisfy the needs of the State. In that regard, you will find a
proposal and contract submitted by the contractors with whom we
met, proposing remedies at a relatively economical cost. You will
note that the proposal includes some of the recommendations of the
study performed by the State, and also includes new aspects which
would enhance resolution of the problem of the plume.
This remedy is, of course, in addition to efforts previously
undertaken by Hartford, including the removal of all carpeting,
treatment or all floors with fungicide on two or three occasions,

p-ofessional evaluation, adjustment and modification of the HVAC
system, tfno'eTevatioii 01 theTsewef veniK. i^ioTjOa^siso.offered
in the past to undertake all ofjthe remedies suggested in Ihe_=^tijdy
contracted for by the atate, but the State declined saying those
tiibrts wouia not De adequate!
Since the State, while acknowledging that all tests indicate
levels of toxicity which are below EPA guidelines, but has been
unwilling or unable to suggest a means by which its agencies would
reoccupy the premises, we propose the following:
1. The proposal and contract offered by £ & G Contractors, Inc.
be immediately executed and the work commenced forthwith.
2. The State assume payment of the cost to £ & G Contractors,
Inc. of the proposed remediation. In that regard, I will again note
that the attorney for LaSalle Oil Company offered $5,000.00 as a
contribution when I first discussed with him the bio remediation
method. I have no doubt that Rio Vista Oil would similarly be willing
to participate in that cost.
3. The State would forthwith pay the lease payment of
$67,920.00 which was due in June of 1988 and either commence
monthly payments of the lease installments due beginning in 'June or
1989; or pay the total sum less the discount, all as is provided by the
lease.
4. The State and Hartford would share the cost of recarpeting,
as required.
This proposal should not be seen as a one-sided demand
against the State. Hartford has suffered and continues to suffer
considerably resulting from the default under the lease for acts of
third parties, and the proposal I have set forth describes minimally
satisfaction of damages which have accrued to Hartford, in the hope
that the problem can be resolved.
Continued delay operates to the disadvantage of both the State
and Hartford and, accordingly, I request that you respond to this
letter within ten (10) days. While I do not expect, realistically, that
outright acceptance of this proposal will be had within that time, I
expect, at the least, an indication that the State is undertaking
appropriate consideration of the matter to be communicated to me.

Thank you for your cooperation.

. Speciale
GHS/tp
Enclosure
cc: Hartford Leasing

ADDENDUM 7
Copies of Mr. Speciale s letters dated June 30, 1989, December 5,
1989 and September 10, 1990
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JOSEPH E. TESCH

DAVID V. THOMAS

CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR

STATE OF UTAH

June 30, 1989

George H. Speciale, Esq.
Suite 1309
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Moab Regional Center/Hartford Leasing Corportaion

Dear George:
I have reviewed your letter and proposal of June 21,
1989 as well as discussed it with Jack Quintana of DFCM.
Your letter greatly mischaracterizes the Staters
position in regard to the subject building. Nevertheless, we are
working on possible solutions for the problems.
I plan on getting back to you shortly with a response
from DFCM to your proposal as well as any counterproposals.
Please note that this letter and all the communications
in our meetings are for pxirposes of settlement only and are not
admissible in litigation.

Sincerely,

tfLJSJL—
ALAN S. BACHMAN
As sitant Attorney General
ASB/dp
cc:

Jack Quintana, DFCM

OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

R. P A U L VAN
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- ATT<*M\ CCNERAI

2*6 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE Cm\UTAH «4114 • TELEPHONE tOl SU 1015 • FAX NO f01538 1121

JOSEPH E. TESCH
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF UTAH

December 5, 1989
George H. Speciale, Esq.
Suite 1309
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

SENT CERTIFIED KAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Moab Regional Center/Hartford Leasing Corporation

Dear George:
Staff from the Division of Facilities Construction and
Management (DFCM) and myself have met on several occasions with
representatives of the employees that previously occupied the
subject facility in Moab, Utah*
I have attached as Exhibit "A" hereto for your
necessary attention all of the conditions that would need to be
met before the employees would be willing to reoccupy the
facility- These conditions are based upon the most recent data
concerning the plume and the condition of the building.
We would like to meet with you to discuss this matter
in detail. An agreement needs to be reached prior to February 1,
1990, if we are to participate in any re-entry.
The purpose of this letter and attachment is for
purposes of settlement only. Thanks for your cooperation.
Sincerely,

ALAN ^5". BACHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
ASB/dp
cc:

Neal P. Stowe, Director, DFCM
Jack Quintana, Assistant Director, DFCM
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JOSEPH E. TESCH
CHIEF Of PUTV ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF UTAH

€©FY
September 10, 1990

George H. Speciale, Esq.
Suite 1309
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Ret

CONFIDENTIAL/Purchase offer

MOAB REGIONAL CENTER/OFFER TO PURCHASE

As you know, the State had asked an independent MAI fee
appraiser to prepare an appraisal of the subject property of the
Hartford Leasing Corporation lawsuit. Please find attached a
copy of that appraisal report dated June 19, 1990, by William R.
Lang, MAI and Brett A. Smith. That appraisal report and this
letter is provided to you for purposes of settlement of this
matter only. The statements in the appraisal report are not
necessarily the position of the State of Utah in regard to the
condition of the building or causes of the evacuation of the
building by the State.
Nevertheless, for purposes of settlement of this matter
only, my client is willing to offer to purchase the subject
property for the market value stated in the report ($155,000.00)
less the costs of restoring the building to a condition for safe
re-occupation (an estimated $30,000.00). This offer is subject
to approval by the Utah State Legislature. A stipulated
dismissal with prejudice from the subject lawsuit would also be
required.
We request your immediate authorization to allow an
architect, hired by the State, to enter the premises for purposes
of evaluating the internal design for the possible re-entry.
The State may also be interested in purchasing
additional property for expansion of the facility.

George H. Speciale, Esq.
September 10, 1990
Page Two

Please call me in regard to this letter. A meeting can
be arranged as soon as possible, if you so desire. It is our
intent to have a resolution of this "purchase" possibility by
October 1, 1990, subject only to legislative approval.
Sincerely,

ALAN S. BACHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
ASB/dp
cc:

Neal P. Stowe, Director, DFCM
Ken Nye, DFCM
Jack Quintana, DFCM
Warren K. Grames, Risk Management

ATTACHMENT:

LANG APPRAISAL

